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Abstract 
 
Transport generates many externalities, some related to atmospheric pollution. In this paper, 
we focus on two: greenhouse gases, and local pollution. In the search for optimal transport 
policies, these two externalities have usually been analysed separately. Here, we study them 
jointly, in a sequential decision-making model. Our model allows for the irreversibility of the 
policies undertaken, as well as the possibility of a progressive reduction of uncertainties with 
the arrival of information. We find that when both sources of externalities are analysed 
jointly, structural measures enabling private transport requirements to be reduced are 
identified as being more advantageous economically than technological measures to reduce 
emissions of pollutants. We illustrate the usefulness of a joint analysis of externalities with 
two examples: tax measures on cars and housing policy. 
 
Keywords: climate change, model of decision-making under uncertainty, irreversibilities, 
transport policy. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Beyond their primary vocation, which is to carry goods and people, our means of transport 
produce numerous harmful effects and generate considerable externalities (CGP, 2001; Infras-
IWW, 2004; Mailbach et al., 2008). They are responsible for road congestion, landscape 
disturbance and road accidents. Moreover, they contribute to a deteriorating environment in 
terms of noise levels, aesthetics and atmospheric pollution (greenhouse gas emissions and 
local pollutants).4 
 
The impact of transport with respect both to climate change (greenhouse gas emissions, or 
GGEs) and to local air pollution (particles, NOX) is a particularly topical issue. In both cases, 
progress on fixed-source emissions has actually led to transport becoming the prime source of 
GGEs: it produced an average of 21% of emissions by the European Union-15 (EU-15), in 
2005 (European Environment Agency, 2007).5 Transport is also the prime emitter of local, 
health-damaging pollutants, producing 36% of total particle emissions in 2007 (European 
Environment Agency, 2009a). Finally, transport is the major source of emissions of NOX, 
generating some 50% of total emissions in 2007 (European Environment Agency, 2009b). 
Road transport accounts for roughly two-thirds of particle and NOX emissions, as well as 90% 
of GGEs of all transport emissions. 
 
Although local pollution and climate change share the same source, they have often been 
analysed separately when pricing policies for transport are determined. In France, for 
example, the government-organised public forum on the environment (Grenelle de 
l’Environnement) recommended introducing a tax system based on both CO2 and particle 
emissions (“Eco-pastille”). This system, however, was adopted only for CO2. Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom, where the Department of Transport (1998, 2008) has been pleading for over 
ten years for joint management of transport and environmental policies, local pollutants and 
GGEs are analysed separately (Begg and Gray, 2004). 
 
Moreover, to date most debates on policies for reducing atmospheric pollutant emissions from 
transport have not satisfactorily taken into account the prevailing major uncertainties, be they 
scientific (the extent of environmental change), economic (the method of evaluating the costs 
of externalities) or technical (the effectiveness of pollution cleanup policies). Thus, in 2000, 
when the French government was updating its recommended reference values for the costs of 
effects (“valeurs tutélaires”), in order to take into account the external costs of transport 
(CGP, 2001), the two Ministries responsible for the environment and for transport disagreed 
over the value of a tonne of CO2 and the health costs of exposure to air pollution. The 
Ministry for the Environment pleaded for much higher values than the Ministry for Transport.  
The latter cited the great uncertainty involved in the evaluation of externalities to defend 
lower valuations. Since these reference values are intended to be applied when assessing 
infrastructure projects, higher values would have a particularly favourable impact on the 
development of public transport systems. More recently, similar differences emerged in the 
debate on the updating of the value of a tonne of CO2 (Centre d’analyse stratégique, 2009) 
                                                 
4
 Greenhouse gases include CO2, CH4, N2O, CF4, C2F6 and SF6. They are usually expressed in CO2 equivalent or 
global warming potential for the purposes of analysis. 
5
 GGEs from the transport sector increased by 25.5% between 1990 and 2005, while emissions from all other 
sources decreased by 7% over the same period. 
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and on the amount of the “climate and energy contribution” tax (Conférence des experts sur la 
contribution Climat et Energie, 2009). 
 
A fuller grasp of the uncertainties, influenced less by special interests, thus seems to be 
needed. Given this context, it appears relevant to place uncertainty in a dynamic framework. 
This requires a sensitivity analysis, clarifying to what extent the values adopted impact on the 
effectiveness of policies.  It also means that policy choices will be conditioned by the effects 
of the arrival of information. For instance, different policies for reducing atmospheric 
pollution could be compared, while taking into account the arrival of information showing 
that the negative effects of one of these externalities are more important than expected. 
 
In this article, we present a model to support public decision-making in the field of transport 
policy. Our model has the advantage of jointly considering both types of atmospheric 
pollution generated by transport (GGEs and particle pollution which we will use as an 
indicator of local pollution). It also includes the principal characteristics of the context with 
respect to uncertainty and irreversibilities, thus providing scope for taking into consideration 
the effect of the arrival of information to influence the choice of policies. The model shows 
that when both sources of externalities are analysed jointly, structural measures enabling 
private transport requirements to be reduced are more advantageous economically than 
technological measures aimed at reducing emissions of pollutants. 
  
The article begins with a description of the decision-making context. We then present the 
general hypotheses of the model in Part 3. Part 4 gives the principal findings. We discuss and 
illustrate the concrete implications of this model in Part 5. Part 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 The decision-making context: Uncertainty and irreversibilities 
in transport 
 
The debate over policies for reducing emissions of atmospheric pollutants by transport is 
complicated by the existence of numerous uncertainties. Despite major advances in the body 
of knowledge on climate change and local pollution, there are persistent scientific, economic 
and technological uncertainties about the effects of GGEs and particle pollution. 
 
Moreover, both these types of pollution have the effect of producing economic and/or 
ecological irreversibilities: i.e. they lead to alterations in the ecological and/or economic 
systems such that it becomes impossible subsequently to return to the initial state. Since no 
future action will enable a return to starting point, the decision-maker has to take into account, 
from the outset, the potential effects of the policies that s/he plans to conduct. Irreversibilities 
therefore complicate the decision-making process, suggesting that the decision-maker should 
be placed in a dynamic framework with the arrival of information enabling him/her to allow 
for the value of expected information (called quasi-option value or information option value). 
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2.1.1. Scientific uncertainties about GGEs 
 
Both the nature and extent of the greenhouse effect and the consequences of GGEs are highly 
controversial (see for instance Michaels, 2005 or Singer, 2008). 
 
Uncertainties about the extent of climate change 
 
With the object of estimating the extent of climate change, numerous scenarios using complex 
models of evaluation based on various hypotheses (climate sensitivity, thermal inertia in 
oceans, net balance of carbon sinks, etc.) have been proposed. Whatever the standpoint, it is 
estimated that the rate of climate change will be faster than any other change experienced over 
the past 10,000 years (Godard and Henry, 1998). 
 
Beyond this certainty, it remains very difficult to estimate precisely the extent of climate 
change, so that scientific studies usually give a range of values. For example, the Fourth 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that if no action 
is taken, there will be an increase in global temperatures of between 1.1 and 6.4° C by the end 
of the 21st century, compared to the 1990-99 period. It further predicts an increase in the sea 
level ranging from 18 cm to 59 cm (IPCC, 2007) and a decrease in rainfall of roughly 15% 
between latitudes 30°N-55°N and latitudes 0°-20°S.  
 
Uncertainties about the consequences of climate change 
 
Estimating the consequences of an increase in the mean temperature of the planet is also 
difficult, since this brings into play a number of factors such as relief, proximity to a body of 
water or latitude. While there is a relative consensus on the potential consequences of climate 
change (changes to temperature distribution, increase in the frequency and intensity of natural 
disasters and contagious diseases), scientific studies do not offer a precise estimation of these 
consequences. The public decision-maker thus has to decide on the basis of scientific reports 
which, while rigorously compiled, contain loose estimates of the consequences of climate 
change. For example, the scientific studies concerning France conclude that climate change 
will bring about changes to rainfall varying from -20% to +50%, depending on location and 
season. 
 
Moreover, while the scientific studies all conclude that these alterations will have major 
economic impacts on the fields of insurance, tourism, agriculture, health, the extent and the 
timing of these effects have not been precisely determined. The IPCC report (2007) estimates 
the socio-economic cost of a 4° C rise in temperature at between 1 and 5% of Gross National 
Product. It evaluates the actualised net economic cost of the damage caused by global change 
at $12/tonne of CO2 in 2005, with a range of $3 to $95/tonne of CO2 (IPCC, 2007). 
 
2.1.2. Scientific uncertainties about particles 
 
The scientific uncertainties surrounding particles are more limited than those surrounding 
GGEs. The processes by which particle pollution affects health and buildings, for example, 
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have already been established. Scientific studies have revealed two major health risks: 
respiratory and cardiovascular morbidity and short-term mortality (WHO, 2005). 
 
However, this does not mean that particle pollution carries no scientific uncertainties. Its 
consequences in terms of morbidity and long-term mortality, as well as on the determination 
of number of life years lost, for example, are not yet fully understood. There are also 
uncertainties concerning the harm to health caused by particles as a function of their source, 
their size and their chemical composition (Hüglin and Gehrig, 2000; Samoli et al., 2006). 
Moreover, these uncertainties are added to those arising from the transfer of Exposure-
Response functions (established for certain geographic zones) to other geographic zones for 
which specific data are not available. 
 
Finally, there are uncertainties over obtaining the full, expected benefit from a particular 
technological measure (such as particle filters). The composition of atmospheric pollution is 
constantly changing (under the impetus of technological evolution and changes in air 
pollution standards) and the indicators measured are just one piece of the picture which, it is 
hoped, are as representative as possible.6 Since they come from the same sources and are 
subject to the same conditions of dispersion by weather, measurements of the concentrations 
of numerous pollutants are strongly correlated. This leads to the risk of attributing excessive 
environmental and health damage to a particular pollutant, because it is measured more 
efficiently, and, as a corollary, underestimating the contributions of the other, associated 
pollutants. This type of uncertainty, however, disappears when there is a simultaneous 
reduction in all emissions. 
 
2.1.3. Economic and technological uncertainties 
 
In addition to scientific uncertainties about physical phenomena, the public decision-maker 
faces technological uncertainties linked to estimating the effectiveness of pollution cleanup 
measures. For example, it is clear that developing electric vehicles will eliminate local 
pollution, but the results in terms of GGEs are more mixed, and will depend on whether or not 
fossil fuels are used to produce the electricity. 
 
Finally, the public decision-maker faces uncertainties of an economic nature when seeking to 
evaluate the costs of the externalities. These economic uncertainties arise essentially from the 
choice of methodology. The decision-maker can choose from various methods of evaluating 
harm, from various monetary values (cost of a morbidity episode, inability to work, the value 
of human life, damage to buildings, impacts on agriculture) and various discount rates. Taken 
together, these choices have major consequences on decisions, so that methodology is often 
the subject of lively political debate, as illustrated by the discussions on the CGP (2001) 
report on reference values in France. Certain approaches, however, are leading to a relative 
homogenisation and stabilisation in methodology: for example, the New Elements for the 
Assessment of External Costs of Energy Technologies (NewExt, 2004) or Clean Air for 
Europe (CAFE, 2005). 
 
                                                 
6
 Up until the introduction of unleaded petrol, “atmospheric lead content” acted as a good measure of 
automobile-generated pollution. The disappearance of lead did not, however, lead to the disappearance of 
automobile-generated pollution, nor of the associated health hazards. 
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2.2. The irreversibilities 
 
It is common practice to distinguish between irreversibilities of an ecological nature and those 
of an economic nature. In this paper, ecological irreversibilities only concern GGEs. Current 
emissions are adding to an atmospheric stock which is very slow to dissipate. For instance, 
Devolder (2008) estimates that 50% of CO2 emitted disappear in 30 years, a further 30% in a 
few centuries and the remaining 20% in a few millennia. If we want to limit global warming 
to 2°C, we will have to decrease total world-wide greenhouse gas emissions by between 50% 
to 85% by 2050 (Devolder, 2008). In terms of the life span of a human being, therefore, the 
phenomenon can effectively be considered irreversible, and the whole range of potential 
strategies needs to be considered from a 20- to 50-year perspective. Conversely, particle 
pollution is not actually irreversible:7 mean particle concentrations in the air can decrease 
rapidly (by 90% in a few days); thus natural regeneration is fairly rapid and there is no 
problem of stock build ups. 
 
The economic irreversibilities connected with GGEs and with particle pollution concern the 
costs entailed in putting policies into practice. Transport use is closely linked to lifestyle, so 
that implementing a fundamental policy takes a relatively long time and probably involves 
sunk costs. 
 
Thus, climate change appears to be a unique phenomenon affecting the whole planet (with the 
problems of coordination that this implies) and involving a long time horizon (with the 
attendant problem of discounting). In addition, it brings into play both irreversibilities and the 
possibility of uncertainties being progressively reduced through the arrival of information. All 
these features argue for it to be treated within the framework of economic theory relating to 
decision-making, under uncertainty with an irreversibility effect (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; 
Freixas and Laffont, 1984; Henry, 1974). Particle pollution, on the other hand, seems 
adequately characterised. Thus, the relative stabilisation of the economic evaluations of health 
costs means that it can be considered as relatively well-known, and hence certain. 
 
 
3. The Model: A Reduced Representation of Transport Economics 
 
We present a sequential model to support decision-making. This model is a reduced 
representation of transport economics, in which the public decision-maker can control 
different decision variables in order to regulate emissions of pollutants from transport.8 The 
model has two periods, which makes it possible to take into consideration the effect of an 
arrival of information on the choice of policies. It focuses on two pollutants (GGEs and 
particle pollution) and considers the two major types of public sector policies currently under 
consideration in most countries: technological measures and structural measures. In essence, 
this stylised model, designed along the lines of the models introduced by Arrow-Fisher (1974) 
and Henry (1974), highlights in a didactic manner the logical arguments in favour of one or 
the other of the policies. 
                                                 
7
 However, from the point of view of those people affected by particle pollution, it can appear irreversible 
insofar as it can cause premature death.  
8
 Since the public decision-maker is the only agent explicitly considered in this model, this model reduces to an 
individual decision-making model. 
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3.1. General structure of the model 
 
In order to take into account the arrival of information and the irreversibilities involved in 
climate change and particle pollution, the model covers two periods, t = 1,2. During each of 
the two periods, the public decision-maker can take action using the three decision variables 
at his/her disposal: 
 
• the proportion of journeys made in private vehicles Vt (the proportion of journeys 
made using public transport naturally being complementary tV−1 ), 
• the rate of reduction of GGEs tG , 
• the rate of reduction of particle pollution tP . 
 
Taking the proportion of journeys made in private vehicles tV  as a decision variable, we 
assume that the decision-maker can choose the equilibrium level in the transport market. In 
addition, as we are dealing with the proportion of journeys made either in private or public 
transport, we therefore also assume that there is a fixed volume of kilometres covered by an 
individual. This strong assumption is intended to simplify analysis. We would otherwise have 
to introduce a collective utility function dependent on total volume. Adding this feature to the 
model however, would make no difference to the qualitative results on the optimal 
internalisation of pollution. 
 
These three decision variables concern both the structural and technological types of policy 
available to the public decision-maker attempting to regulate atmospheric pollution. 
 
The first variable is the product of structural measures: the number of kilometres covered in 
private road transport is altered, thus affecting overall externalities. Such policies aim at, for 
example, increased car-sharing, reduced city centre access and parking, as well as more 
efficient public transport. The public decision-maker is absolutely free to choose how policies 
are implemented (urban tolls, enlarged public transport networks, special traffic lanes 
reserved for vehicles carrying at least three people, increased taxes on all fuels). Because 
these policies affect total emissions, they are less sensitive to uncertainty than technological 
measures. 
 
The other two variables for the reduction of emissions of pollutants concern technological 
measures targeting the emission rates of pollutants per kilometres travelled. These are, for 
example, policies aimed at improving technologies like particle filters or NOX filters; at 
renewing the car fleet with less polluting vehicles (low-emission or zero-emission levels) or at 
traffic management (speed limits). These technological policies can be implemented in 
various ways, by imposing standards on fuels, through green tax incentives, through the “Eco-
pastille” system. However, these measures have limitations, generally targeting emissions 
from a single pollutant (CO2, SO2, particles, NOX). Moreover, the gains obtained from 
technological improvements can very easily be partially lost following an increase in the 
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volume of individual journeys, for instance.9  
 
3.2. The objective function of the public decision-maker 
 
In order to take both types of policy into account, the objective function of the public 
decision-maker needs to distinguish between costs associated with structural policies and 
costs associated with technological policies. Formally, the public decision-maker is looking to 
minimise the total social costs of transport, which can be broken down as follows: 
 
   Total costs = Variable costs of transport + Pollution cleanup costs + Pollution costs 
 
• The variable costs of transport are given by a function )1(. tt VCV −+α  where (.)C is 
differentiable and convex. α  is a unit cost per km travelled in a private vehicle.10 
• Pollution cleanup costs are linked to technological measures and can be broken down 
into two parts. The linear part ( ) ttt VPG ... γβ +  represents variable costs where β  (γ ) is 
the unit cost per km travelled of a total reduction in GGEs (particle emissions). The 
non-linear part )()( tt PEGD +  represents the fixed costs which are taken to be 
positive, increasing and convex. 
• The costs of the pollution vary with the proportion of individual journeys: 
( ) ( )( ) ttt VPG .1.1. −+− φθ  where θ  (φ ) represents the extra cost per GGE (particle) unit 
of pollution emitted from a private vehicle as compared to public transport. We 
consider the rates of emissions per passenger-kilometre from public transport to be 
lower than those from private vehicles. We also assume that whatever the values taken 
by θ  and φ  in the model, we still have βθ ≥  and γφ ≥  and that therefore any 
attempt at pollution cleanup is always effective. 
 
In the end, the function of the total cost that the public decision-maker has to minimise at t = 
1,2 is the following:  
 
( )
( ) ( )( ) .1.1.
)()(...
)1(.);;;;(
ttt
ttttt
ttttt
VPG
PEGDVPG
VCVPGVCT
−+−+
++++
−+=
φθ
γβ
αφθ
 
 
This cost function has the advantage of being relatively simple, while realistically 
synthesising the genuine social costs generated by transport. Operational applications would 
no doubt require an adjusted version. 
                                                 
9
 The results of a study by the European Environment Agency (2000) on the evolution of energy efficiency in 
transport since the beginning of the 1970s are instructive. Although engines have become more fuel-efficient 
(using roughly 30% less fuel), the energy used per passenger-kilometre in car transport has remained constant. 
The fact is that this period has witnessed increased traffic congestion, fewer passengers per car, increased car 
weight (in the same categories), and shorter average car journeys. 
10
 To suppose that private transport costs are linear (αVt) is probably unrealistic. However, it should be noted 
that a convex function in (1- Vt) is formally equivalent to a concave function in Vt. Hence, the function C(.) can 
formally take account of concave costs for private transport, which is fairly realistic (amortisation of vehicle 
purchasing costs by households decreases with the total number of kilometres travelled, for example).  
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3.3. Uncertainty and information 
 
We take into account the fact that the public decision-maker has to decide on a policy to 
reduce emissions of pollutants from transport, even though s/he is aware that there are 
uncertainties about the consequences of the emission of these pollutants. We have already 
mentioned that the main uncertainties concern the values of the costs connected with GGEs. 
Hence, our analysis focuses on these values. 
 
Formally, we use θ  and φ  to denote the expected supplementary costs per unit of GGE and 
of particle pollution respectively. In the case of GGEs, we assume that this cost can be higher 
or lower (with equal probability) by an amount ε  with <ε θ  (this assumption excludes the 
possibility of discovering that climate change is economically favourable). 
 
Moreover, we assume that the public decision-maker is able to learn the exact costs of GGEs 
between period 1 and period 2 and we call g = 0,1 the indicator of the arrival of such 
information. This assumption makes it possible to study the impact that anticipating the 
arrival of information has on the optimal decision.  
 
3.4. Irreversibilities and intertemporal externalities 
 
In order to obtain a suitable representation of the situation, our model includes two types of 
decisional irreversibilities (or intertemporal externalities). 
 
The first irreversibility concerns the decision about developing public transport. This kind of 
decision usually needs to be taken well in advance. Accordingly, a relevant assumption is that 
it will not be possible in the second period to adjust the proportion of public transport 
upwards: 12 11 VV −≤− , that is 12 VV ≥ . This extreme assumption is consistent with certain 
structural decisions, such as development of heavy infrastructures for public transport 
(tramways, undergrounds), urban development policy involving a more or less densely-
populated habitat. We will call i = 0,1 the indicator of the presence of such an irreversibility 
constraint: [ ]1;. 12 ViV ∈ . This first intertemporal externality is induced from the fact that the 
costs of investments in public transport depend on the level of public transport in the 
preceding period. The indicator shows the presence (i = 1) or the absence (i = 0) of 
intertemporal investment costs. 
 
The second irreversibility concerns the choices of rates of reduction of emissions 2G and 2P : 
12 GG ≥ and 12 PP ≥ . Indeed, these levels of emission reduction are usually fixed by 
environmental standards. Experience shows that there is no going back on environmental 
regulations (for example, the enforcement of the desulphurisation of diesel or the use of 
unleaded petrol), and that any changes always tend towards reinforcing standards, thus 
diminishing rates of emission. It can therefore justifiably be assumed that these standards will 
not be relaxed in the future. We introduce c = 0,1 as an indicator of the presence of 
irreversibility constraints: 
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[ ] [ ] 2,1 ,1;.,1;. 11 =∈∈ −− tPcPGcG tttt  
 
3.5. The reference solution 
 
To examine the effect of the arrival of information, we consider the optimal stationary 
solution in the absence of information as the reference situation. It is therefore not necessary 
to consider the sequential nature of the model, and the total cost function can simply be 
minimised over one period. We call this the optimal solution ( )∗∗∗ PGV ,; ; it represents a 
situation where (i) marginal costs of private and public transport are the same, and (ii) 
marginal costs of pollution cleanup are the same as marginal profits. ( )∗∗∗ PGV ,;  is therefore 
the solution to the following system: 
 
   
( ) ( )





=′+
=′+
−
′=−+−+++
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗
VPEV
VGDV
VCPGPG
.)(.
.)(.
)1(1.1...
φγ
θβ
φθγβα
                       
 
This optimal stationary solution is not dependent on the presence of irreversibility constraints. 
 
 
4.  The results 
 
We look at sequential choices over the two periods, with the arrival of information between 
Period 1 and Period 2.  
 
To simplify the presentation of the results, we choose to eliminate two extreme cases which 
are unrealistic. The first entails the public decision-maker taking no pollution cleanup 
measures, so that we have a zero cost of pollution cleanup, and a maximum cost of extra 
pollution. The second case that we eliminate is where the public decision-maker reduces the 
proportion of private transport to zero, so that we get maximum cost of pollution cleanup and 
a zero cost of extra pollution.  
 
Having eliminated these two unrealistic extreme cases, we seek an optimal intermediate 
solution. By definition, this optimal solution minimises overall total costs over the two 
periods. It should be noted that the second period costs may depend on decisions taken during 
the first period under irreversibility constraints 1=i  and/or 1=c : 
 
  ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] );;;;(;;;;;; 2221;.,1;.,1;.111 121212 φθφθ PGVCTMinciPGVJ PcPGcGViV ∈∈∈=  
 
We use ( )gciPGVJ ;;;;;;; 111 φθ  to denote the anticipated value of the total optimal costs of the 
second period, conditional on the choices of the first period. Two cases are possible: 
 11
 
• No information (g = 0): 
 
( ) ( )ciPGVJciPGVJ ;;;;;;0;;;;;;; 111111 φθφθ =  
 
• Information on climate change (g = 1): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ciPGVJciPGVJciPGVJ ;;;;;;;;;;;;.2/11;;;;;;; 111111111 φεθφεθφθ −++=  
 
The optimal choices of the first period are denoted ( )gciV ;;1∗ , ( )gciG ;;1∗  and ( )gciP ;;1∗ . These 
optimal choices are the solution to the problem of minimising overall costs over the two 
periods: 
 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] ( )gciPGVJPGVCTMin PGV ;;;;;;;);;;;( 1111111;0,1;0,1;0 111 φθφθ +∈∈∈  
 
In the absence of information, even though two periods were considered, the optimal 
stationary solution is also the optimal solution to the problem of minimisation, whatever the 
nature of constraints i and c: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) .0;; ,0;;,0;; , 111 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ ===∀ PciPGciGVciVci  
 
Similarly, anticipating information has no effect in the first period without irreversibility 
constraints )0( == ci . The value function for the second period, ( )gPGVJ ;0;0;;;;; 111 φθ , is 
thus independent of the decisions taken in the first period, and we obtain: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) .;0;0 ,;0;0,;0;0 , 111 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ ===∀ PgPGgGVgVg  
 
Solving this model reveals two types of effects: effects related to the expectation of 
information and those related to the presence of irreversibility. We present the results 
concerning these two types of effects in the following subsection. 
 
4.1. The effects of expecting the arrival of information 
 
In models that take into account decisional irreversibilities and where there exists a quasi- 
option value, expecting the arrival of information generally encourages the decision-maker to 
make more flexible choices (due to the irreversibility effect). Indeed, more flexible choices 
enable the decision-maker to use the information better. 
  
Owing to the structure of the model detailed herein, an irreversibility effect is expected for the 
rates of emission reduction. In other words, greater flexibility is expected to result in lower 
rates of emission reduction as compared to the reference situation. Expecting the arrival of 
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information on climate change leads to setting a reduction rate for GGEs in Period 1 which is 
lower than that of the stationary reference solution ( ( ) ( )0;;1;; 11 ciGciG ∗∗ ≤ ). 
Expecting an arrival of information leads not only to direct irreversibility effects but also to 
supplementary effects, as described in Proposition 1 below. 
 
Proposition 1: When an arrival of information is expected, the optimal policy is to reduce the 
proportion of private transport and the reduction levels for emission rates of both pollutants:  
ci,∀  (1) ( ) ( ),0;;1;; 11 ciVciV ∗∗ ≤  (2) ( ) ( )0;;1;; 11 ciGciG ∗∗ ≤ , (3) ( ) ( )0;;1;; 11 ciPciP ∗∗ ≤   
 
Result (2) corresponds to the direct irreversibility effects usually encountered. The other 
results correspond to the supplementary effects and can easily be understood. Because there is 
a higher rate of emission for the pollutant concerned by the arrival of information, the 
marginal cost of private transport is increased compared to the reference situation and the 
optimal policy is to increase the proportion of public transport (Result (1)). In the process, the 
economic advantages from the pollution cleanup of the other pollutant (particles) are reduced, 
and the optimal policy is to reduce the level of reduction in emissions of this pollutant as well 
(Result (3)). The formal proof is contained in the Appendix. 
 
4.2. The effects of irreversibilities and intertemporal externalities 
 
Irreversibilities and investment costs have an effect comparable to that of information. If 
information arrives, 1=g , irreversibility constraints lead to reducing simultaneously the 
proportion of private transport and the level of reduction of emissions.  
 
Proposition 2: The introduction of irreversibility constraints leads to a lower proportion of 
private transport and lower levels of reduction in emission rates: 
 
a) when these constraints concern the proportion of public transport: 
,c∀  (1) ( ) ( ),1;;01;;1 11 cVcV ∗∗ ≤  (2) ( ) ( )1;;01;;1 11 cGcG ∗∗ ≤ , (3) ( ) ( )1;;01;;1 11 cPcP ∗∗ ≤ . 
 
(b) when these constraints concern the rates of emission reduction: 
i∀  (1) ( ) ( ),1;0;1;1; 11 iViV ∗∗ ≤  (2) ( ) ( )1;0;1;1; 11 iGiG ∗∗ ≤ , (3) ( ) ( )1;0;1;1; 11 iPiP ∗∗ ≤  
 
Irreversibility constraints introduce a problem of flexibility. 
 
In the second period, if the information received indicates that environmental impacts are in 
the upper range, then the optimal policy will be to develop public transport. The irreversibility 
constraint concerning public transport will thus force the public decision-maker to take a more 
flexible decision in the first period, that is, to increase the proportion of public transport 
starting from the first period (Result (a-1)). Since the proportion of private transport is 
reduced, the economic advantages of pollution cleanup are also reduced, which explains 
Results (a-2) and (a-3). 
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Those irreversibility constraints which concern rates of emission reduction pose a problem 
when the information received indicates that the impacts of climate change are in the lower 
range. To increase flexibility and allow the GGEs reduction rate to be adjusted downwards, 
the public decision-maker has to limit this emission reduction rate, starting from the first 
period (Result (b-2)). The marginal cost of private transport in the first period is thus higher, 
which explains Result (b-1), indicating that the proportion of private transport should be 
reduced. As a final consequence, the economic advantages from pollution cleanup are also 
reduced, explaining Result (b-3). The formal proof is contained in the Appendix. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Two Illustrative Examples 
 
These results show that the presence of uncertainties has two effects. First, uncertainty 
strengthens the economic attractiveness of structural measures which reduce the need for 
private transport. Second (and conversely), it weakens the attractiveness of technological 
measures which reduce pollutant emissions. This runs contrary to the arguments of economic 
and industrial lobbyists, who generally prefer technological measures to structural measures 
which can pose a threat to their economic importance or competitiveness, and who use 
uncertainty to support the scenarios most favourable to themselves. 
 
The presence of irreversibilities also adds to the attractiveness of structural measures. 
However, these irreversibilities are not necessarily taken into account in the right way during 
political decision-making. Countries currently planning, for example, to invest in the 
extensive development of electric vehicles, like France or the Netherlands, are not making 
fully explicit the irreversibilities that such a plan will entail in terms of electricity supply and 
generation. 
 
In the model, we presumed that the public decision-maker was simultaneously setting the 
rates for emission of the pollutants, conferring on him/her a high level of rationality and an 
advanced level of sophistication in the treatment of the externalities. In practice, decisions are 
often taken in a less-integrated manner; the public decision-maker only considers one single 
dimension of the problem at a time. This way of working means that the optimisation problem 
is dealt with by acting only on the proportion of private transport ( tV ), and on one of the two 
rates of emission ( tG  or tP ) – the other rate being considered as fixed. It can be conjectured 
that in many cases this truncated analysis may lead to reducing private transport less than 
optimal policy would suggest. 
 
In practice, truncated analyses of this nature produce even worse consequences because the 
respective choices of rates of emission are not so independent. For example, in the case of the 
‘Eco-pastille’, inciting people to purchase diesel vehicles only moderately reduces GGE rates, 
but considerably increases local pollutant emission rates. Box 1 quantifies the environmental 
consequences of the Eco-pastille in terms of external costs in the EU-15.  The “urban sprawl” 
phenomenon described in Box 2 illustrates the disastrous economic and environmental 
consequences of government policy that encourages single-family housing without taking the 
associated externalities into consideration. 
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Box 1: The Eco-pastille for Cars in the EU-15 
 
Tax policies on vehicles and fuel have proved effective in reducing the CO2 emissions of a 
fleet (see for example Ryan et al, 2009). Thus, the Eco-pastille or green incentive scheme 
operating in several European countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, Sweden) bases an “environmental” tax policy solely on emissions of CO2 . 
In doing so, it favours the vehicles with the lowest CO2 emissions (especially diesel engines) 
but which produce highly damaging NOX or ultrafine particles that are particularly harmful to 
health. Mayeres and Proost (2001) pointed out that the cost in environmental terms of diesel 
vehicles was far higher than that of petrol vehicles, because of the high social cost associated 
with their particle emissions. The gains expected from lowering average emissions of CO2 can 
easily be quantified and compared with the external costs expected from extra emissions of 
particles (and of NOX ), ignoring the other external costs (accidents, traffic congestion, noise, 
landscape disturbance due to roads) which obviously remain identical. 
 
The weighted average emission rates for urban/non-urban road journeys in EU-15 are 0.045 
g/veh-km for petrol vehicles and 0.2185 g/veh-km for diesel vehicles (Infras-IWW, 2004). 
For CO2 emissions, the average emission rates of the current fleet are estimated at 165 g/km 
for petrol vehicles and 150 g/km for diesel vehicles. 
 
The external cost of 1 kg of PM10 emitted is estimated at €212 (Infras IWW, 2004), while a 
tonne of CO2 is subjected to a sensitivity analysis: between €20 (a low estimate falling within 
the Kyoto objectives) and €140 (a high estimate yielding a reduction of 50% in 2030). 
 
Thus, the external costs associated with CO2 and with particles for 100 km travelled are €1.28 
(€3.26 under the high estimate) for a petrol vehicle, compared to €4.93 (respectively €6.73) 
for a diesel vehicle, in other words roughly 4 (respectively 2) times less. Projecting this on the 
average number of kilometres travelled by a vehicle over its lifetime (200,000 km according 
to European Union, 2007), then this represents a difference of some €7,300, rising to €10,200 
if NOX emissions are included at the values given by European Union (2007). These orders of 
magnitude are confirmed by Mailbach et al. (2008), who perform a similar analysis 
simultaneously taking into account NOX, non-methane volatile organic compounds 
(NMVOC), SO2 and PM10. Using data on emissions from the German car fleet, they obtain an 
external cost 4 times higher for diesel vehicles than for Euro 5-standard petrol vehicles, 
whatever the engine size. 
 
So the Eco-pastille system actually provides support for the boom – and technological 
progress – in vehicles that create an environmental footprint, through their emissions of local 
pollutants (particles), which is two to four times more harmful, in exchange for a 10% gain on 
CO2. A paradoxical consequence of this dieselisation of the fleet is that GGEs from petrol 
vehicles decreased by 17% between 1990 and 2005 for EU-15, while those from diesel 
vehicles increased by 83% (source EEA 2007). 
 
The European Union recently addressed the problem by drawing up a proposal for a directive 
obliging the authorities in Member States, when they buy transport vehicles, to take into 
account not only the exploitation costs linked to energy consumption and CO2 emissions, but 
also those linked to NOX, NMVOC and particle pollution (European Union, 2007). This 
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obligation is intended to take effect from 1st January 2012 – if indeed it is adopted. 
Meanwhile, certain countries are applying more judicious Eco-pastille policies. The 
Netherlands, for example, requires all new diesel vehicles to have a particle filter, and since 
2008 some German cities (like Berlin, Cologne and Hanover) have been regulating traffic in 
certain zones, according to emission standards.  
 
 
Box 2: Urban Sprawl and the “House for €15 per Day” 
 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, households have been moving out of most European city 
centres and inner suburbs into peri-urban zones. Yet planners and environmental researchers 
alike point to the negative impact of this urban sprawl, which increases the length of journeys 
between home and workplace (see for example Bartholomew, 2007). Certain policies 
encouraging single-unit housing promote this phenomenon. For example, the so-called “house 
for €15 a day” offered in France aptly illustrates the negative consequences of a lack of 
overall analysis of externalities. In this box, we estimate the extent of the external effects, in 
terms of emissions of CO2 and particles, that this policy could generate. 
 
The private vehicle of a household resident in a peri-urban zone travels on average 25,300 
km/yr, as compared to 13,700 km/yr for a household living in an urban or suburban area 
(average weighted by zones of residence, Insee, 2009). In view of the findings from Box 1 
and the current composition of the French car fleet (50% are diesel vehicles and the 
proportion is increasing constantly), the external cost relative to atmospheric emissions can be 
estimated at €3,670 over 10 years (respectively €5,870, using the upper range for a tonne of 
CO2). When the external costs linked to accidents, noise and traffic congestion (€0.0614 per 
vehicle per km, Infras IWW, 2004) are added in, the total estimate is as high as €10,800 
(respectively €13,000) over 10 years. 
 
Over and above the external effects, the supplementary private expenditure of someone 
purchasing this kind of house represents on average €4,570 over 10 years in fuel costs 
(Lemaître and Kleinpeter, 2009), added to which are the effects of lower energy efficiency in 
the home. Thus, expenditure on household energy weighted by type of heating is twice as 
high when the dwelling is single-unit (6.7% of household budget) than when it is multi-unit 
(3.34%) (Marcus, 2009), i.e. some €6,000 difference over 10 years according to Grosmesnil 
(2002). 
 
In total, the extra cost associated with a “house for €15 a day” in a peri-urban zone is €20,000 
over 10 years, and this is bound to rise with the application of the “climate and energy 
contribution” tax (CCE), which has not yet been implemented, but which is set to be €100 in 
2030 (Conférence des experts sur la contribution Climat et Energie, 2009). It should be noted 
that under its affordable housing legislation, the French government intends to extend this 
measure to apartments, which would mitigate the analysis in this Box. 
 
 
Thus, externalities linked to the effects of emissions from road transport are the object of 
varying uncertainties, depending of what is being evaluated: uncertainties are lessened when 
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the reduction envisaged is global rather than concentrated on one pollutant. During the phase 
of internalisation, therefore, it is useful to think about the effects of the policy chosen: does it 
act on overall externalities (structural policy) or does it target only one of them (technological 
policy)? 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have analysed the choice of a policy to reduce GGEs and local pollutant emissions linked 
to transport in a model of sequential decision-making under uncertainty. We have looked at 
two types of policy, structural policies acting on overall emissions and technological policies 
targeting certain pollutants. We have examined the effects of the arrival of information and of 
the irreversibility of the policies adopted on the optimal decision. One of our findings is that 
jointly taking both pollutants into account weakens the attractiveness of a policy aimed at 
reducing local (particle) emissions alone and, instead, strengthens the attractiveness of a 
structural policy aimed at limiting private transport in general. Some promising avenues for 
future research would be to take into account explicitly the uncertainties concerning the 
consequences of GGEs and the costs associated with particle pollution, as well as to 
investigate the question of the irreversibility linked to stocking these gases.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
 
Step 1: Properties of 2nd period choices  
We denote ,2∗V  ∗2G  and ∗2P  the optimal solutions of the optimisation problem 
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] ).;;;;(;;;;;; 2221;.,1;.,1;.111 121212 φθφθ PGVCTMinciPGVJ PcPGcGViV ∈∈∈=  
 
These optimal solutions are functions of ( )ciPGV ;;;;;; 111 φθ . They satisfy the following 
optimality conditions:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
 . if  0.)(.or  . if  0.)(.
. if  0.)(.or  . if  0.)(.
. if  0)1(1.1...
or  . if  0)1(1.1...
1222212222
1222212222
1222222
1222222
PcPVPEVPcPVPEV
GcGVGDVGcGVGDV
ViGVCPGPG
ViVVCPGPG
=≥−′+>=−′+
=≥−′+>=−′+
==−′−−+−+++
>=−′−−+−+++
φγφγ
θβθβ
φθγβα
φθγβα
 
 
We show first that the 2nd period optimal choices increase with the 1st period choices 1V , 1G  
and 1P . 
(a) Assume 11 VV > . Let us assume that we do not have  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .;;;; and 
;;;;
,;;;;
2111221112
2111221112
2111221112
∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗
=≥=
=≥=
=≥=
PPGVPPPGVP
GPGVGGPGVG
VPGVVVPGVV
 
• Suppose ad absurdum that we have ∗∗ < 22 VV , ∗∗ ≤ 22 GG  and 
∗∗ ≤ 22 PP . Then, we show that: 
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( ) ( ) 0)1(1.1... 22222 <−′−−+−+++ ∗∗∗∗∗ VCPGPG φθγβα  
 
Since 1122 VVVV >≥>
∗∗
,  
( ) ( ) 0)1(1.1... 22222 =−′−−+−+++ VCPGPG φθγβα  
Given that θβ ≤ , the assumption that ∗∗ ≤ 22 GG  implies that ( ) ( ).1..1.. 2222 ∗∗∗∗ −+≤−+ GGGG θβθβ  
Similarly, we have  
( ) ( ).1..1.. 2222 ∗∗∗∗ −+≤−+ PPPP φγφγ  
The assumption that ∗∗ < 22 VV  implies that )1()1( 22 ∗∗ −′>−′ VCVC . Therefore, we have:  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0)1(1.1...
)1(1.1...
22222
22222
=−′−−+−+++
<−′−−+−+++
∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗
VCPGPG
VCPGPG
φθγβα
φθγβα
 
which proves that the optimality conditions are not satisfied. 
• Note that ∗∗ < 22 VV  and ∗∗ > 22 GG  is not feasible, since then we would have  
.0.)(..)(. 222222 ≥−′+>−′+ ∗∗∗∗∗∗ VGDVVGDV θβθβ  
But since 122 .GcGG ≥>
∗∗
, the optimality conditions imply that 0.)(. 222 =−′+ ∗∗∗ VGDV θβ  
which contradicts the hypothesis. A similar argument can be used to prove that ∗∗ < 22 VV , and 
∗∗ > 22 PP  is not feasible. 
• Note that ∗∗ ≥ 22 VV  and ∗∗ < 22 GG  is not feasible either, since then we would have  
..)(..)(. 222222 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ −′+<−′+ VGDVVGDV θβθβ  
Because 12 .GcG ≥
∗
, we have 12 .GcG >
∗
, and the optimality conditions imply that 
0.)(. 222 =−′+ ∗∗∗ VGDV θβ . We therefore have 0.)(. 222 <−′+ ∗∗∗ VGDV θβ , which proves that the 
optimality conditions cannot be satisfied. We can show that ∗∗ ≥ 22 VV  et 
∗∗ < 22 PP is not feasible 
using a similar argument.  
On the whole, we obtain that ∗∗ ≥ 22 VV , ∗∗ ≥ 22 GG  and 
∗∗ ≥ 22 PP . 
 
(b) Assume 11 GG > . Note that if 12 .GcG ≥∗ , then ,2∗V  ∗2G  and ∗2P  satisfy the optimality 
conditions when the first period choices are ( )111 ;; PGV . Consequently ∗∗ = 22 VV , ∗∗ = 22 GG  and 
∗∗
= 22 PP .  
Let us consider the case where 121 .. GcGGc ≥> ∗ . Since 12 .GcG ≥∗ , then ∗∗ > 22 GG . Assume that 
we do not have ∗∗ ≥ 22 VV , and that instead we have ∗∗ <≤ 221 VVV .  
Since φγ ≤ , then  
∗∗∗∗∗∗
−′+>−′+ 222222 .)(..)(. VPEVVPEV φγφγ  
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and thus ∗∗ ≤ 22 PP . We would thus have 
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Thus, by reduction, we would have: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
−+−<−+− 22222222 ..)(..)(..)(..)( VGVGVGVG θβθβθβθβ  
and since 0≤−θβ , we would have 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ +≥+ 22222222 ..... VGVGVGVG  
or 
( )( ) 0. 2222 ≥−− ∗∗∗∗ VVGG  
which contradicts ∗∗ > 22 GG  and 
∗∗ < 22 VV . Yet, since 
∗∗ ≥ 22 VV , we also have 
∗∗ ≥ 22 PP  which 
proves that the 2nd period choices increase with 1G . 
 
A similar argument can be used to prove that the 2nd period choices increase with P1. 
 
Step 2 : Property of the 2nd period value function.  
We will show that the 1st order derivatives of the function ( )ciPGVJ ;;;;;; 111 φθ  with respect to 
the 1st period choices are positive. We have:  
∂J
∂V1
= α + β.G2∗ + γ .P2∗ + θ. 1− G2∗( )+ φ. 1− P2∗( )− ′ C (1−V2∗)( )∂V2∗∂V1
+ β.V2∗ + ′ D (G2∗) −θ.V2∗( )∂G2∗∂V1 + γ .V2
∗ + ′ E (P2∗) − φ.V2∗( )∂P2∗∂V1
 
 
If ( ) 0.)(. 222 >−′+ ∗∗∗ VGDV θβ , then 12 .GcG =∗  and therefore 012 =∂∂ ∗VG . Consequently,  
( ) 0.)(.
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2
222 =∂
∂
−
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and similarly 
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V
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 21
If 
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Step 3: Proof of proposition 1.  
For PGVx ,,= , ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗∗∗∗ == xciPGVxcix ;;;;;;0;; 21 φθ  are the solutions of the following 
problem 
[ ] ( ).0;;;;;;;);;;;( 1111111;0,, 111 ciPGVJPGVCTMinPGV φθφθ +∈  
subject to: 
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( ),;1;;1 ciV ∗  ( )1;;1 ciG∗  and ( )1;;1 ciP∗  satisfy the optimality conditions 
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Let us assume that proposition 1 is not true, and see what happens.  
• First, suppose that ( ) ,1;; 11 ∗∗∗ >= VVciV  ( ) ∗∗∗ ≥= GGciG 11 1;;  and ( ) ∗∗∗ ≥= PPciP 11 1;; . This 
implies that one of the following three values  
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is strictly positive. Since we have shown that the 1st order derivatives of J are positive, 
then one of the optimality conditions that ( ),1;;1 ciV ∗  ( )1;;1 ciG∗  and ( )1;;1 ciP∗  have to 
satisfy, is not satisfied.  
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• Suppose that ( ) ,1;; 11 ∗∗∗ >= VVciV  ( ) ∗∗∗ <= GGciG 11 1;;  and ( ) ∗∗∗ ≥= PPciP 11 1;; . Note first 
that  
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0);;;;(
0);;;;(
1
1
111
1
=
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
φθ
φθ
PGV
V
CT
PGV
V
CT
 
Therefore, because function CT is convex,  
);;;;();;;;( 1111 φθφθ ∗∗∗∗∗∗ > PGVCTPGVCT  
cannot hold. 
Consequently, we have 
( )
( )1;;;;;;;);;;;(
1;;;;;;;);;;;(
111111
11
ciPGVJPGVCT
ciPGVJPGVCT
φθφθ
φθφθ
∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
+≤
+
 
which proves that the solution ∗∗∗ 111 ;; PGV  is not the optimal solution.  
 
• Similarly, if we assume that ( ) ,1;; 11 ∗∗∗ >= VVciV  ( ) ∗∗∗ <= GGciG 11 1;;  and 
( ) ∗∗∗ <= PPciP 11 1;; , then we can show that  ( )
( )1;;;;;;;);;;;(
1;;;;;;;);;;;(
111111
1111
ciPGVJPGVCT
ciPGVJPGVCT
φθφθ
φθφθ
∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
+≤
+
 
Therefore, the solution ∗∗∗ 111 ;; PGV  is not optimal.  
• Suppose that ( ) ∗∗∗ ≤= VVciV 11 1;;  and ( ) ∗∗∗ >= GGciG 11 1;; . Note that this assumption 
cannot hold, since then we would have 
0.)(. 111 >−′+ ∗∗∗ VGDV θβ  
and because 0
1
≥∂
∂
G
J
,  
0.)(.
1
111 >∂
∂
+−′+ ∗∗∗
G
JVGDV θβ  
Similarly, ( ) ∗∗∗ ≤= VVciV 11 1;;  and ( ) ∗∗∗ >= PPciP 11 1;; is not feasible. 
End of the proof by contradiction. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
 
We sketch out the proof for result (a). Result (b) can easily be proven using a similar 
argument.  
Let us start with the benchmark case 0== ci  and 1=g . 
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We show that  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )0;0;;;;;1;0;00;0;;;;;
1;0;00;0;;;;;
0;0;;;;;1;0;00;0;;;;;
212
12
212
φεθφεθ
φεθ
φεθφεθ
−≤=≤+
=≤−
−≤=≤+
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
PGVPPPPGVP
GGPGVG
PGVVVVPGVV
 
 
If 1=c , then for the first period choices ∗∗∗ PGV ,,  the constraint is binding for ∗2G  at εθ −  
and for ∗2P  at εθ + . We can show that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
≤=+
≤=−
≤≤+
PPPGVP
GGPGVG
VVPGVV
1;1;01;0;;;;;
1;1;01;0;;;;;
1;1;01;0;;;;;
1112
1112
1112
φεθ
φεθ
φεθ
 
 
Similarly, if 1=i  (with 0=c ), then for ∗∗∗ PGV ,,  the constraint is binding for ∗2V  at εθ + . 
We can show that  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ∗∗
∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗
≤
≤
≤≤+
PP
GG
VVPGVV
1;0;1
1;0;1
1;0;10;1;;;;;
1
1
1112 φεθ
 
 
Lastly, if 1=i  (with 1=c ), then for ( ),1;1;01∗V  ( ),1;1;01∗G  ( )1;1;01∗P  the constraint is binding 
for ∗2V  at εθ + . We can show that  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1;1;01;1;1
1;1;01;1;1
1;1;01;1;1
11
11
11
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
≤
≤
≤
PP
GG
VV
 
 
